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Shortly after the first Kennedy appointees took office in 1961, the
Federal Trade Commission abandoned its "peripatetic" approach to
hearing contested cases and adopted the rule of continuous hearings
which generally prevails in the courtroom.' This development, along
with increasing Commission awareness of the needs of fairness, has
meant that discovery requests no longer involve only a question of pre-
serving the confidentiality of FTC files or of agency discretion. When
interrupted hearings were the rule, the respondent had time to develop
alternative sources of information; now that avenue may not be
available.
This fact was perceived by the Commission, which gradually has
evolved rules of discovery not dissimilar to the Federal Rules governing
civil actions. During the past six years, the agency has overhauled its
procedural rules on three occasions and, in the process, has relaxed
many restrictions on the taking of depositions. At first, orders to take
depositions were granted solely to preserve testimony; then only if the
moving party demonstrated "good cause" for taking the deposition;
and, finally, if the party showed that the deposition would constitute
or contain evidence. Now, the need for information concerning the
Commission's case in order to facilitate preparation of respondent's
defense may be sufficient support for a request to a hearing examiner
for an order to take a deposition.' (Because of the Commission's ex-
t Associate Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1956, LL.B. 1962, Uni-
versity of Minnesota. Member, Ohio Bar.
'FTC Procedures and Rules of Practice §4.14(d), 26 Fed. Reg. 6019 (1961),
now 16 C.F.R. §3.16(d) (1967); see Address of Commissioner Philip Elman, The
Administrative Process and the Rule of Law, American Marketing Ass'n 21, June 20,
1961. But see Thermochemical Prods., Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8725, 3 TRADE REG. REP.
18,062 (1967).
2 See Mezines & Parker, Discovery Before the Federal Trade Commission, 18
An. L. R.v., Winter-Spring, at 55 (1966).
3FTC Procedures and Rules of Practice §3.33, 32 Fed. Reg. 8451-52 (1967),
as amended, 32 Fed. Reg. 9158 (1967) [current rules hereinafter cited as FTC Rules].
See All-State Indus., Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8738, 3 TRADE REG. RE'. ff 18,103, at 20,550
(1967):
The rules for adjudicatory proceedings are intended to embody the Commis-
sion's conviction that, to the fullest extent practicable, the strategy of surprise
and the art of concealment will have no place in a Commission proceeding.
(401)
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tensive investigative powers which are generally used to develop the
evidence necessary to support complaint counsel's case, the rule changes
have in practice affected only respondent's once non-existent right of
discovery.'). Further impetus for expanded discovery of confidential
information has been added by the passage of the so-called Freedom
of Information Act,' which became effective this past July fourth. The
swift pace of these events, on the other hand, has resulted in ad hoc
and sometimes inconsistent rulings.
In contrast to these developments in the discovery area, Com-
mission policies requiring open hearings and full public disclosure of
evidence have changed little since these policies were elaborated in
1961.' Rulings still tend to chant the time-honored slogans supporting
public trials, without considering whether the resulting harm may out-
weigh any possible benefits. Nor has anyone probed the apparent
double standard of confidentiality applied in FTC hearings, which
favors disclosure of private business secrets while protecting the secrecy
of government files. Current judicial criticism of the FTC practice
of delivering publicity releases to the press on issuance of a complaint,7
indirectly suggests, however, that a re-examination of public hearing
axioms may be in order.
Moreover, recent Supreme Court decisions in the area of criminal
procedure raise serious questions about the fairness of agency rulings
on confidentiality.8 Developments in criminal procedure, of course, are
not necessarily controlling in administrative proceedings. But recent
Supreme Court decisions relating to criminal discovery reflect a grow-
ing concern for what elemental fairness or, specifically, due process,
may require. There should be no hesitancy in applying criminal law
discovery rules to the extent that similar fairness demands are present in
agency proceedings. Nor is this suggestion novel. Administrative
procedure always has been subject to due process limitations; ' thus,
statements by government witnesses in FTC hearings must be made
available to respondent during the hearing for purposes of cross-
4 But see Associated Merchandising Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8651, [1965-1967 Trans-
fer BinderI TRADE REG. REP. 17,335 (1965).
5 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (Supp. II 1967). But see Statesman Life Ins. Co., FTC Dkt.
No. 8686, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,790 (1966).
6 See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 58 F.T.C. 1184 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Hood].
7 See Marlo Furniture Co. v. FTC, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1967 Trade Cas.) 72,194
(D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1967); Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 5
TRADE REG. REP. (1967 Trade Cas.) 72,072 (D.D.C. April 13, 1967). See also
Statesman Life Ins. Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8686 (Dec. 22, 1967).
8 See, e.g., Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) ; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963).
9 E.g., FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143-44 (1940); Lon-
doner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); Communist Party of the United States v.
SACB, 254 F.2d 314, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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examination-a rule first applied by the Supreme Court to criminal
prosecutions."0 Current questions in the criminal area which ultimately
may affect FTC practices involve the scope of the agency's obligation
to disclose information which might aid the defense, including evidence
supporting respondent's case or identifying non-party complainants.
Despite the frequency of contested demands for sensitive in-
formation, few attempts have been made to consider the policies in-
volved in determining whether government or business information
asserted to be confidential shall be disclosed, and, if so, whether dis-
closure must be made in full public view." Nor have standards
governing the treatment of confidential matter been developed ade-
quately. The basic questions are readily identifiable: What constitutes
confidential information? Who should determine whether it is con-
fidential? How should confidential information be treated? The
development of responsible policy, however, will depend upon several
additional factors: Why is the material asserted to be sensitive? For
what purpose is disclosure or discovery sought? In what way would
public disclosure be beneficial-or harmful? This study examines
these and related questions in the context of Federal Trade Commis-
sion practice.
The traditional order of analysis is reversed here in two respects.
Since agency procedures commonly follow earlier judicial developments,
this discussion, contrary to common law tradition, first will examine the
general principles regarding judicial trials and then the specifics of
FTC practice. In addition, since the FTC first explored the question
of confidentiality at the hearing level (that is, trial stage) of its pro-
ceedings, consideration of problems at the investigative and pre-trial
stage will be postponed to a subsequent article,' while treatment of
sensitive data at the trial stage is examined here.
PUBLIC HEARINGS
The current controversy surrounding fair trial and free press re-
flects the age-old conflict between the benefits and perils which flow from
public trials. The premise underlying public trials is that publicity
"operates as a check upon [the] mendacity and incorrectness" of wit-
nesses and "keeps the judge himself, while trying, under trial." '" The
'0 See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); Communist Party of the
United States v. SACB, 254 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
"Cf. Newman, Federal Agency Investigations: Procedural Rights of the Sub-
poentaed Witness, 60 MIcH. L. REV. 169, 172 (1961).
12 Both studies are limited to FTC treatment of confidential information in adju-
dicative and investigative proceedings. This does not exhaust the problems of confi-
dentiality faced by the Commission. For example, the related problem of "secret
law" in FTC practice explored in other contexts by Professor Davis are outside the
scope of this article.
1 1 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDIcIAL EviDENcE 522, 523 (1827).
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openness of hearings not only protects the parties, but also serves to
inform the bar and public. In general, the pervasive rule, grounded on
common law precedents,14 constitutional commands 5 and statutory
requirements,'" is that a judicial trial shall be conducted openly, with
all evidence available to public scrutiny. The lessons of the infamous
Star Chamber have become categorical imperatives. Thus, it is
agreed: "Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in com-
parison of publicity, all other checks are of small account." 17
Adhering to the judicial pattern, administrative agency hearings
on adjudicatory matters, with few exceptions, are public. Indeed, the
enabling legislation of many agencies requires that adjudicatory hear-
ings be public.' The Federal Trade Commission Act contains no such
congressional expression. 9 Nevertheless, the Commission's practice,
almost since its inception, has been for proceedings to become a matter
of public record upon service of the complaint." As a result, challenges
have been raised, not to the Commission's refusal to grant a public
hearing, but rather to its insistence that all hearings be open to the
public-and the press. For example, in E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v.
FTC,"' a distributor, whose advertisements of the medicinal qualities
of its bath salts outran the product's laxative abilities, argued that until
the FTC had determined finally that its activities constituted an unfair
trade practice, the Commission's function was wholly inquisitorial and
necessarily secret. The court upheld the Commission's public hearing
rule, however, on the ground that the FTC Act provision specifically
permitting third-party intervention ' is rendered meaningless unless
the proceeding is public. Moreover, the Commission is authorized to
adopt rules necessary to carry out the policies of the Act,23 and open
14 6 J. WIGmopm, EVIDENcE § 1834 (3d ed. 1940).
15 E.g., U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; CAL. C NsT. art. I, § 13; ILL. CONST. art. II,
§ 9; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 13; Mic. CONST. art. I, § 20; N.J. CoNsT. art. 1, § 10;
ORE. CoNsT. art. I, § 11.
lOE.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. §§.252.155, 256.14 (1957); see FED. R. Cwv. P. 43(a),
77(b).
17 1 J. BENTHAM, supra note 13, at 524.
'sSee, e.g., Securities and Exchange Act of 1933, § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 77u (1964);
Interstate Commerce Act § 17(3), 49 U.S.C. § 17(3) (1964).
19 Section 5(b) of the FTC Act merely states that the Commission shall conduct
a "hearing." 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964). Cf. FTC v. Flotill Prods., Inc., 88 S. Ct
401, 403 (1967).
2 0OSee E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v. FTC, 63 F.2d 362, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1933);
Graber Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, 223 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (D.D.C. 1963); S. Doc. No. 186,
76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 6, at 14 (1940) ; cf. FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1965).
The current requirement for public hearings is stated in FTC Rules § 3.41(a). At
one time the Commission treated the Hearing Examiner's report as a confidential
document. See Arnold Stone Co. v. FTC, 49 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1931).
21 63 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
22FTC Act §5(b), 15 U.S.C. §45(b) (1964).
23FTC Act §6(g), 15 U.S.C. §46(g) (1964).
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hearings are consistent with the FTC's overall function. Although it
was not mentioned by the court, it also could be argued that, in light
of the theory supporting public hearings, the public interest may require
that adjudicatory proceedings be open unless overriding considerations
are present.24
EVIDENTIARY LIMITS ON PUBLIC TRIALS
The drive for publicity does not end with the rule of public trials
and hearings; coupled with this requirement is the general duty in-
cumbent upon all citizens to give testimony. "[T]he public has a right
to every man's evidence," 25 even if a witness's privacy, time and labor
must be sacrificed. Because the demand comes from the community
as a whole, rather than from the parties, and because the obligation is
essential to any search for justice, "all privileges of exemption from
this duty are exceptional." 26
Nonetheless, numerous evidentiary exceptions are recognized
which limit public disclosure of facts and hence impinge upon the
principle of universal publicity.-r The principal examples are evi-
dentiary privileges relieving a witness of his testimonial obligation to
disclose confidential communications or to make self-incriminating
statements. Such privileges also may bar the disclosure of government
and trade secrets or preclude the admissibility of illegally obtained
evidence. These limitations on universal publicity are justified as
necessary for the protection of interests and relationships which are
regarded as having sufficient social importance to warrant the sacrifice
of full factual disclosure.25 Since this rationale is equally applicable to
agency trials, it has been asserted that evidence privileged in civil
proceedings is, in principle, privileged in administrative hearings.
29
24 See also Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 14, 18-19 (1938); Greene v.
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959) (dictum).
2512 D. COBBET'S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY 675, 693 (1812), quoted in 4 J.
WIGMORE, EvIDENcE § 2192, at 2965-66 (1st ed. 1905). See generally 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §2192 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
26 8 J. Wiwopyo, EvDmENcE, supra note 25, § 2192, at 73 (emphasis omitted).
27 For example, exclusionary rules deny the admission of hearsay and opinion
testimony into evidence. Secondary evidence is similarly barred. These rules of
exclusion are designed to aid the process of determining the facts by guarding against
evidence which may be unreliable or likely to mislead. See generally C. McCoRMICK,
EVIDENCE, chs. 3, 23, 25 (1954). They are unrelated to the problem of confidentiality
in administrative proceedings, however, for two reasons: (1) their application is
restricted in administrative hearings, 2 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 14.01 (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS TREATISE] ; see John Bene & Sons, Inc. v.
FTC, 299 F. 468 (2d Cir. 1924); and (2) the sensitivity of the information is not
the basis for exclusion.
2 8 See generally C. McCoRMICK, supra note 27, ch. 8.
29 Cooper, Federal Agency Investigations: Requirements for the Production of
Documents, 60 MIcH. L. REV. 187, 202 (1961) ; see 2 DAVIS TREATISE § 14.08, at 286-87.
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Testimonial Privileges
Several evidentiary privileges are obviously inapplicable to FTC
hearings. Testimony concerning marital communications and physician-
patient consultations generally does not occur in Commission hearings,
because these privileges usually apply only to personal, non-business
communications, while FTC hearings invariably involve business firms
and activities. Similarly, the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination is generally inapplicable to Commission hearings, since
it only protects natural persons, and since section 9 of the FTC Act
confers immunity from criminal prosecution for such compelled testi-
mony.3° Problems involving the admissibility of confessions are also
not present, because the Commission has only civil jurisdiction.3
Other questions of privilege arise only infrequently and, if the
policy sought to be promoted by the privilege applies equally to an
administrative hearing, the privilege is accepted readily by the Commis-
sion. For example, the attorney-client privilege is explicitly recognized
in Commission cases denying disclosure of government documents.3 2
Presumably, because it is designed to protect a relationship which is a
predicate to fair adjudicative hearings,' it also applies to communica-
tions between respondent and its counsel. In one unusual FTC case
which involved illegally obtained evidence, the only question con-
sidered by the Commission was whether the facts came within the
constitutional exclusionary rule.34  There was no doubt that the con-
30 FTC Act § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1964); see Sherwin v. United States, 268 U.S.
369 (1925); FTC v. Harrell, 313 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1963) ; United States v. Pardue,
294 F. 543 (5th Cir. 1923). See generally 1 DAvis TREATISE §§ 3.07-.09. But appli-
cation of the immunity provision does not preclude the Commission from issuing a
cease and desist order against persons so testifying, even though the order is based
upon such testimony. Drath v. FTC, 239 F.2d 452 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 917 (1956).
81 See note 68 infra; FTC v. Ruberoid, 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952) ("Orders of
the Federal Trade Commission are not intended to impose criminal punishment or
exact compensatory damages for past acts, but to prevent illegal practices in the
future.") ; Coro, Inc. v. FTC, 338 F.2d 149, 153 (1st Cir. 1964). But see Diamond
Alkali Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8572, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 18,078 (1967).
32 E.g., Viviano Macaroni Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8666, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. 1 17,467 (1966) ; cf. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963) (IRS); CAB v. Air Transp. Ass'n of
America, 201 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1961). But cf. Air Transp. Ass'n, CAB Dkt.
No. 10281 [1960-1964 Transfer Binder] Av. L. REP. 1121,355 (1963). See also Miller,
The Challenges to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 49 VA. L. REV. 262 (1963).
33 However, questions have been raised in recent years as to whether the attorney-
client privilege should be applied to corporations. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963); Jox, Attorney-Client Privilege-Its Appli-
cation To A Corporate Client, 3 WASHBURN L.J. 33 (1963); Miller, supra note 32.
34 In Knoll Assoc., Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8549, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. RE'. 117,668 (1966), the Commission found that documents allegedly stolen by
one of respondent's disgruntled employees, in fact, only had been taken without
authority. Hence, it held the exclusionary rule inapplicable. Agreeing that the facts
did not raise a constitutional issue, Commissioner Elman nevertheless argued that the
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stitutional command controlled Commission hearings. On the other
hand, a court has held that the FTC need not honor a claim of
accountant-client privilege which was not recognized at common law.3 5
Definition of the scope of some evidentiary privileges, however,
is affected by the agency context. Asserting privileges for trade secrets
and sensitive business information has become the latest sport of re-
spondents' and witnesses' attorneys and is the current vehicle for delay.
Conversely, the disclosure of internal agency materials has particularly
vexed the Commission in recent years.3 6
complaint should have been dismissed because the apparent impropriety impaired the
Commission's "obligation to maintain public confidence in the agency's processes and
personnel." Id. at 22, 974. Earlier in the proceeding, in denying respondent's attempt
to enjoin the Hearing Examiner from admitting the tainted documents into evidence,
a federal district court came to the questionable conclusion that no illegal search and
seizure had occurred, because the government had taken no part in the theft. Knoll
Assoc., Inc. v. Dixon, 232 F. Supp. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), appeal dismissed purmlant
to stipulation, Case No. 29078 (2d Cir. June 9, 1965). But cf. Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206 (1960). A second case involving the means utilized by the Commission
in acquiring documents is now before the court. Wolmart Discount Corp. v. Dixon,
Civ. No. 2044-67 (D.D.C.), reported in CCH TRADE REG. REPORTS No. 322, at 3
(Aug. 28, 1967).
35 FTC v. St. Regis Paper Co., 304 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1962). While this case
involved an attempt to protect information turned over to a trade association (of
which respondent was a member) from production in response to an investigative
subpoena, the rationale of the ruling appears equally applicable to agency hearings.36 Neither the FTC nor the courts have focused properly on what law governs
the Commission's recognition or refusal of a testimonial privilege. Where the privilege
is constitutionally required, the question is of no weight. But as to other privileges,
Congress undoubtedly has the power to establish or bar testimonial privileges in
agency proceedings.
The FTC Act is typical of agency enabling legislation and it makes no mention
of whether privileged testimony or documents are immune to disclosure in hearings-
or to compulsory process in investigations. (A recent exception is the Antitrust
Civil Process Act which excludes privileged material from its disclosure requirements.
15 U.S.C. § 1312(c) (2) (1964). The only federal statute relating to privileged com-
munications denies the marital communication privilege in some bankruptcy matters.
Bankruptcy Act §21(a), 11 U.S.C. §44(a) (1964).) Professor Davis has made
the provocative suggestion that § 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, which
provides that "any oral or documentary evidence may be received," is authority for
agency rejection of unsound or questionable privileges. 2 DAvis TREATISE § 14.08,
at 287. It seems doubtful, however, that this provision reasonably can be interpreted
as addressing itself to the question of testimonial privilege; rather, the legislative
history suggests that its purpose was to avoid binding administrative agencies to
technical rules of evidence. 92 CONG. REc. 2157, 5653 (1946) ; see ATTORNEY GENERAL,
MANUAL ON THE: ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr 76 (1947). Legislative omission,
moreover, is seldom convincing support for deviation from common law practices.
See CAB v. Air Transp. Ass'n of America, 201 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1961).
On the other hand, it seems clear that the Commission is empowered to recognize
privileges at the hearing stage under its authority to adopt such rules as are necessary
to implement the Act. FTC Act § 6(g), 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1964) ; cf. Hunt Foods
& Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 286 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1960). As yet it has not done so.
See FTC Rules § 3.43, 32 Fed. Reg. 8453 (1967). In addition, the FTC apparently
never has considered whether recognition of a testimonial privilege not of constitutional
dimensions is required. In a leading case concerning enforcement of an SEC subpoena,
Judge Learned Hand explicitly assumed that agency proceedings are "subject to the
same testimonial privileges as judicial proceedings. . . ." McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d
377, 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937). Except for the Ninth Circuit,
other courts have either made the same assumption or considered the matter a question
of federal law. E.g., Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 951( 1963); FTC v. St. Regis Paper Co., 304 F.2d 731 (7th Cir.
1962); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953); United States v.
Threlkeld, 241 F. Supp. 324 (W.D. Tenn. 1965); In re Kearney, 227 F. Supp. 174
408 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Trade Secrets
Courts long have given protection to various types of confidential
business information on the principle that intentionally inflicted harm
is actionable unless privileged. This protection has been extended
not only against improper appropriation and disclosure by others, but
also has included a qualified limitation on the testimonial duty of the
possessor of secret information. As the economy has become more
sophisticated and business more complex, the subjects which have been
classified as trade secrets and entitled to protection have expanded.
Patentable inventions as well as those falling short of the
statutory standards of novelty or inventiveness may be held
as trade secrets. The technology associated with produc-
tion-including plans, specifications, and general "know-
how"-is frequently maintained as a trade secret. Non-
technological internal business organization and operating
methods may also be claimed as secrets, as may general
methods of doing business, advertising campaigns, market
research studies, and even lists of customers and suppliers.
About the only type of subject matter which cannot be
maintained as a secret is an abstract idea or general principle
not embodied in a specific form or application.'
(S.D.N.Y. 1964). Contra, Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960) ; see In re
Bretto, 231 F. Supp. 529 (D. Minn. 1964) (Baird applied pursuant to stipulation of
the parties). Nevertheless, Congress' failure to act and the Commission's abstention
arguably raises a choice of law problem which, under the Rules of Decision Act,
requires the application of state law.
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution . . . or Acts
of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of de-
cision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply.
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964). A perceptive student comment suggests, on the other hand,
that the courts unwittingly may have adopted the appropriate solution, because the
issue arises within a framework of federal law and such interstices have often been
filled by case-made federal law. Comment, 31 U. Cul. L. REv. 395 (1964).
Where adoption of a state-recognized privilege will not frustrate a federal agency's
program and a uniform approach is not essential, the courts should resort to state
law to determine whether the privilege is required, until federal legislation or agency
rules occupy the field. Id. Since the -entire choice of law question and whether an
agency must recognize a privilege can be avoided by the simple expedient of rule-
making, amendment of the FTC rules before the omission becomes troublesome seems
an appropriate solution. The FTC, however, need not adopt new rules setting forth
specific boundaries within which various privileges will be recognized. For most
privileges a simple statement, such as that confidential communications between an
attorney and his client are privileged, should suffice--especially where there is no
controversy.
37 Note, 64 HA'v. L. Rzv. 976 (1951). Under this theory, unauthorized disclosure
is classified as a competitive tort of misappropriation or unfair competition. Develop-
ments in. the Law: Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. REv. 888, 947 (1964). Trade
secrets are also protected under concepts of property, contract trust or confidence.
See, e.g., property: Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 96 Am. Dec. 664 (1868);
Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889) ; contracts, trust or confidence:
Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare 241, 255, 68 Eng. Rep. 492, 498 (1851); E. I. Du Pont
de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917) (dictum). See gen-
erally C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS oN ToRTs 1174 (1959).
38 Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and
Antitrust Supremacy, 80 HRv. L. Ray. 1432, 1437 (1967) (citations omitted).
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In one respect, the protection afforded trade secrets by injunctive
actions to prevent wrongful disclosure is similar to the privilege
applied to marital, physician-patient and attorney-client communica-
tions, since, in each of these situations, legal protection is given to the
confidential relationship and the party who disclosed the information
in confidence is entitled to demand that such confidence be maintained. 9
At the same time, the trade secret privilege is distinct from these other
privileges and from actions protecting the secret itself, in that the
privilege is not designed to protect the confidential relationship per se,
but rather protects the "information" contained in the confidential
communications from widespread dissemination." The privilege,
therefore, depends on the type of information that is sought to be
withheld and the nature of the interests that will be affected if it is
disclosed or withheld.
As a result, courts never have given absolute recognition to the
trade secret privilege. If the trade secret is indispensable for ascertain-
ing the facts in a lawsuit, the possessor of the secret (or one who has
knowledge of it) will be compelled to reveal it.41  But "courts are
loath to order disclosure of trade secrets absent a clear showing of an
immediate need for the information requested." '  As with other
privileges, this threshold showing applies whether the information is
sought at trial or during discovery.' Moreover, once disclosure is
deemed necessary, the court will usually impose conditions designed
to limit the demanding party to use of the information only in the
litigation and to prevent disclosure of the secret to non-party com-
petitors or the public at large."
39 See E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102
(1917) (Holmes, J.); C. McCoRMIciC, supra note 27, chs. 9, 10, 11.
4 0 See 8 J. WIGmORE, supra note 25, at § 2212(3).
41 What the state of the law actually is would be difficult to formulate
precisely. It is clear that no absolute privilege for trade secrets is recognized.
On the other hand, courts are apt not to require disclosure except in such
cases and to such extent as may appear to be indispensable for the ascertain-
ment of truth. More than this, in definition, can hardly be ventured.
Id. at 156-57; see Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 964 (1965).
424 J. MooRE & B. GAmImrKEL, Fnmxua PRAccicE 26.2213], at 1290 (2d ed.
1966).
43 FEa. R. Cirv. P. 30(b), 31(d), 33, 34; see United States v. American Optical
Co., 39 F.R.D. 580 (N.D. Cal. 1966). See generally Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 383 (1951).
44 See generally Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 509 (1958). The justification for resort
to in camera procedure was first explained in Scott v. Scott [1913] A.C. 417, 437-38:
[I]t may well be that justice could not be done at all if it had to be done in
public. As the paramount object must always be to do justice, the general
rule as to publicity, after all only the means to an end, must accordingly yield.
But the burden lies on those seeking to displace its application in the particu-
lar case to make out that the ordinary rule must as of necessity be superseded
by this paramount consideration,
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As one would expect, the techniques by which protection has been
provided vary as much as the subjects given protection. One device
commonly used sacrifices the principle of public hearings and prohibits
public disclosure by taking trade secret evidence in private session, or
"in camera." " Continuing secrecy is assured by sealing the record,
limiting use of such evidence by the parties and the court, and imposing
a duty of continuing secrecy on the part of those participating in the
in camera proceeding.46 Disclosure often has been limited to counsel
and those assisting him.47 Where the data is to be evaluated by
experts or used for comparative purposes, disclosure may be limited to
disinterested experts and once the comparisons are made, the results,
but not the underlying data, will be revealed. 4s In addition, the data
may be disguised to prevent recognition of the source of particular
information.49
Despite the scope and variety of these protective devices, courts
have been less than sanguine concerning their effectiveness in limiting
public disclosure of trade secrets. As the late Judge Dawson color-
fully pointed out in an antitrust merger proceeding, the effect of even
"protected disclosure" is that everybody in the industry "takes their
clothes off and nothing is secret anymore." "0 NoAetheless, disclosure
rather than protection is the rule because of the overriding interest re-
quiring that each party be empowered to obtain all evidence needed to
prove his case. Undoubtedly contributing to this judicial liberality,
despite much skepticism, is the view once expressed by Mr. Justice
Cardozo that "[b]usiness men as a rule are not wholly in the dark as
to the ways of their competitors." 51 Hence, the injury resulting from
disclosure, on balance, often is thought to be more imagined than real.
4 5 See, e.g., Ferment Acid Corp. v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., 338 F.2d 586 (7th
Cir. 1964) ; Masland v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co., 224 F. 689 (3d Cir.
1915), rev'd on other grounds, 244 U.S. 100 (1917) ; A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum
Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1934). In the first case which appears to
have adopted this procedure, Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. Levenstein, 24 Ch.
D. 156 (1883), the court excluded court reporters as well as the public and received
the evidence in camera with only the court, the parties and their expert witnesses
present.
4 6 See, e.g., A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531 (6th
Cir. 1934); Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
State ex rel. Ampco Metal, Inc. v. O'Neill, 273 Wis. 530, 78 N.W.2d 921 (1956).
4 7 See, e.g., Cone Mills Corp. v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons, Co., 33 F.R.D. 318
(D. Del. 1963) ; United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 193 F. Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
4 8 See, e.g., Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Celanese Corp. of America, 10 F.R.D. 458
(D. Del. 1950).
49 See, e.g., Empire Rayon Yarn Co. v. American Viscose Corp., 160 F. Supp.
334 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
50 Transcript of Pre-Trial Hearing at 30, United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 193
F. Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), quoted in Brief for Respondent at 9, Crown Cork &
Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687 (Dec. 14, 1966).
51 Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 323 (1933).
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The Federal Trade Commission's position regarding trade secrets
is an ambiguous and often curious mixture of substantive protection
and procedural denial. In connection with the Commission's sub-
stantive support of trade secrets, section 5 (a) (1) of the FTC Act
declares "[u]nfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair
. . . acts or practices in commerce" unlawful.52 Early in its history,
the Commission viewed this provision as a mandate to prohibit the use
of espionage, bribing of employees or similar means to procure a com-
petitor's secrets.53  Inducing employees of competitors to violate their
employment contracts or enticing them away in such numbers or under
such circumstances as to hamper a competitor's business also was
declared unlawful.54 Except in connection with the issuance of trade
practice rules,55 however, the Commission's affirmative protection of
trade secrets has been narrowly confined, because the Commission's
jurisdiction applies only to activities in interstate commerce and to
actions which are "in the interest of the public"; '6 trade secret
violations, in other words, are seldom serious enough to warrant
Commission intervention. As a result, the private law of unfair
competition has continued to develop independent of the FTC.57
On the procedural side, Congress has placed no restrictions on
the Commission's evidentiary treatment of trade secrets.8 The FTC
Act, for example, does not indicate whether the Commission need
recognize a trade secret privilege.59 Section 6 (f) prohibits Commission
disclosure of "trade secrets and names of customers" in its published
52 15 U.S.C. §45(a) (1) (1964).
53T. C. Hurst v. FTC, 268 F. 874 (E.D. Va. 1920) ; California Packing Corp.,
25 F.T.C. 379 (1937); FTC v. Oakes Co., 3 F.T.C. 36 (1920); FTC v. American
Agricultural Chem. Co., 1 F.T.C. 226 (1918); Botsfard Lumber Co., 1 F.T.C. 60,
87 (1918); see Note, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1928). Curiously, the Commission,
itself, was found guilty of a similar practice under the guise of an official proceeding
when, in one of its initial proceedings, it sought information concerning the production
of "Syndolag" (a patented article used to repair the bottoms of open hearth steel
furnaces) for use by the Navy Department. United States v. Basic Prods. Co., 260
F. 472 (W.D. Pa. 1919).
5 4 Cook-Master, Inc., 46 F.T.C. 532 (1950); Darling & Co., 30 F.T.C. 739
(1940); Standard Car Equip. Co., 1 F.T.C. 144 (1918).
5 See, e.g., Trade Practice Rules for Commercial Dental Laboratory Industry,
16 C.F.R. § 18.6 (1967) (enticing away employees of competitors); Trade Practice
Rules for Gummed Paper and Sealing Tape Industry, 16 C.F.R. § 19.12 (1967)
(procurement of competitors' confidential information).
r5 FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 28 (1929); Winslow v. FTC, 277 F. 206 (4th
Cir. 1921) ; New Jersey Asbestos Co. v. FTC, 264 F. 509 (2d Cir. 1920) ; Note, 45
H~Av. L. Rv. 1248, 1251 (1932); see Hernard Mfg. Co., 49 F.T.C. 1560 (1952).
57 See Handler, Unfair Competition and The Federal Trade Commission, 8 GEo.
WAsH. L. REv. 399, 409 (1940); Klein, The Technical Trade Secret Quadrangle:
A Survey, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 437 (1960).
5 8 Although it has never been directly ruled upon, one court has indicated that
fairness requirements prevent uncontrolled disclosure of trade secrets in FTC hearings.
See Graber Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, 223 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (D.D.C. 1963); cf. FCC v.
Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 296-98 (1965).
59 See note 36 supra.
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reports,' but this admonition does not govern adjudicative hearings.61
Newly-enacted section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act (the
so-called "Freedom of Information Act") exempts from its disclosure
requirements "trade secrets and commercial or financial information," 61
but it specifies no affirmative agency obligation in the handling of trade
secrets in adjudicative proceedings. The Commission's rules also
make no provision for any trade secret privilege at hearings.' Its
decisions, therefore, must be the starting point for any analysis. 5
Early FTC practice used denial of the trade secret privilege, in
effect, as an enforcement device in unfair trade practice cases. In
FTC v. Clarke,"6 the first case disputing reliance on the privilege, a
respondent charged with deceptive advertising declined to reveal the
exact ingredient proportions of his "blood building tablets." On the
Commission's application to require respondent to answer, the court
68 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1964). Section 10 of the FTC Act also prohibits any FTC
officer or employee from making public, without authority, information obtained by
the FTC. 15 U.S.C. § 50 (1964). This provision is now duplicated for all federal
government employees. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1964).
61 FTC v. Tuttle, 244 F.2d 605, 616 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 925 (1957).
0 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (4) (Supp. II 1967). The original provision in § 3(c) of
the Administrative Procedure Act affirmatively gave agencies the authority to keep
information "confidential for good cause shown," 60 Stat. 237 (1946); but it, too,
did not govern adjudicative proceedings. But cf. Graber Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, 223 F.
Supp. 1020, 1022 (D.D.C. 1963).
63 See generally Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U.
CHi. L. REv. 761, 787-92 (1967); Note, 56 GEo. L.J. 18 (1967); Note, 40 NoTRE
DAmE LAW. 417 (1965).
64 FTC rules, however, do specify that hearings shall be public, that transcripts
are available upon payment of a standard fee and that in camera hearings or procedures
may be adopted only in exceptional cases for good cause. FTC Rules §§ 3.41(a),
32 Fed. Reg. 8452 (1967) ; 3.44(a), id. at 8453; 3.45(b), id. at 8454.
65 Since rulings by FTC examiners are not readily available, it only can be
assumed that examiners adhere to these Commission opinions. The FTC still must
take many steps to implement fully the policies set by Congress in the recent amend-
ment of § 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The FTC does not publish its
official reports until almost four years after a case is decided, and hearing examiner
decisions and FTC rulings on interlocutory appeals-both of critical importance when
attempting to ascertain FTC practice and policy on procedural or evidentiary ques-
tions-are not fully reported anywhere. See, e.g., Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC
Dkt. No. 8687 (Comm'n Opinion April 10, 1967) (3-2 opinion on treatment of sensi-
tive information demanded of third parties) (summarized briefly only in BNA, AmTi-
TRUST & TRADE RzG. REP. No. 301, at A-22 (April 18, 1967)); Uarco, Inc., 58
F.T.C. 1168 (1961) (official report does not include order ruling on motion to remove
documents from public record reported in [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. 115,423 (FTC 1961)); Sun Oil Co., FTC Dkt. No. 6934 (Comm'n Opinion
Sept. 15, 1958) (interlocutory opinion adopting the rule of the Jencks case in FTC
hearings apparently never reported in either official or unofficial reports or services).
Not only are FTC reports incomplete and published late, but the subject index of
those decisions published is wholly unsatisfactory. Cf. Newman, Government and
Ignorance-A Progress Report on Publications of Federal Regulations, 63 HARv. L.
Rzv. 929 (1950). The index requirement imposed by amended § 3 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act is, on the other hand, limited to agency matters adopted or issued
after July 4, 1967. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (2) (Supp. II 1967). See also Davis,
The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHi. L. REv. 761, 781-82 (1967).
633 F.T.C. 1812 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
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ruled the question material and necessary to ascertain the facts. Ac-
cording to the court, the privilege was narrower in FTC proceedings
because more than private parties and rights were involved. Hence,
upon respondent's continued refusal to reveal his product's chemical
composition, he was held in contempt of court 17 and imprisoned. Such
FTC reliance on judicial sanctions to enforce a respondent's testimonial
duty causes needless delay and seems unwarranted, since the FTC can
only order a respondent to cease an unlawful practice and, upon failure
to observe such an order, can impose only civil and not criminal
liability." In no other case has the Commission felt compelled to seek
this remedy. Moreover, in this particular case, respondent's answer-
and possible revelation of a trade secret-was not even "necessary."
The FTC, by reliance on expert witnesses, already had demonstrated
that the product lacked any "blood building effects"; thus the examiner
could have avoided the problem by ruling that the burden of going
forward " (and along with it the need to disclose the exact in-
gredients) had shifted to respondent.
Subsequent Commission cases have utilized this technique of
transferring the burden of going forward. Thus, in Charles of the Ritz
Distributors Corp. v. FTC,7" a cosmetic firm charged with misrepre-
senting the therapeutic effect of its "Rejuvenescence" foundation
cream was not privileged
to stand upon its refusal to disclose the true formula of its
preparation as a trade secret . . . ; and its failure to intro-
duce evidence thus within its immediate knowledge and
control, if existing anywhere, of the rejuvenating constituents
and therapeutic effect of its preparation is strong confirmation
of the Commission's charges.71
In Evis Manufacturing Co. v. FTC,72 on the other hand, the
court overruled the Commission's reliance on respondent's silence as
evidence that the product would not perform as claimed. The court
67See Clarke v. FTC, 128 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1942).
68Clayton Act §11(1), 15 U.S.C. §21(1) (1964); FTC Act §5(1), 15 U.S.C.
§45(1) (1964); see 15 U.S.C. §56 (1964). See also note 31 supra.
0 For an analysis of the burden of persuasion in the law of evidence, see C.
McCoRMICK, supra note 27, §306; J. THAYER, EvmmEcE 357-59 (1898). See UxI-
FoaR RuLE oF EvmrwcE 1(4).
70 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944).
7 Id. at 679.
7255 F.T.C. 1483 (1959), rev'd, 287 F.2d 831 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
824 (1961) (refusal to disclose composition and processing of metal in respondent's
water conditioner). This case represents an unhappy chapter in FTC practice and
warns that serious consequences may follow adjudicative hearings, even though no
order results. "[Riespondent's case was twice dismissed by the hearing examiner
who was twice reversed by the Commission. On appeal the respondent finally pre-
vailed. But the adverse publicity and the drain on company finances for the litigation
put it out of business." Farley & Farley, An American Omnedsin n: Due Process
in the Administrative State, 16 AD. L. REv. 212, 213 n.5 (1964).
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distinguished Evis from Ritz on the grounds that in Evis (1) satisfied
user testimony contradicted expert testimony that respondent's product
was falsely advertised, and (2) a patent application was pending for
the process which justified respondent's strenuous claim of a trade secret.
Several problems inherent in the technique of transferring the
burden of going forward are apparent: it fails to focus on the type of
protection respondent's trade secret should have; nor is it flexible
enough to account for different degrees of secrecy; and under this
approach trade secrets are entitled either to total protection or to none
at all-the trade secret privilege cannot receive varying degrees of
protection, as is true elsewhere. 73 Furthermore, respondent's reliance
on satisfied user testimony to answer Commission experts will usually
not be sufficient rebuttal, despite the Evis decision.74 Thus, under the
transfer theory, a respondent relies on the privilege only at the risk
that, if it is denied, such reliance may constitute sufficient evidence to
support a finding of unlawful practices. This burden seems unreason-
ably heavy. In any case, the transfer of the burden of going forward
approach would seem to be limited to assertions of trade secrets by
respondents; it can have no relevance in determining whether to
recognize a witness' trade secret claim.
Not surprisingly, the first reported recognition of in camera pro-
ceedings in an FTC hearing involved a trade secret claim by a non-
party witness. In Segal Lock & Hardware Co. v. FTC,75 the Second
Circuit had to determine whether respondent was denied a fair hearing
by an in camera demonstration by two witnesses (before a hearing
examiner and without counsel present) of how respondent's supposedly
pick-proof lock could be picked. The court ruled that this secret
session did not deny respondent's right of cross-examination, since
under the Commission's broad, yet proper, definition of a "pick-proof"
lock (that is, one which could not be opened without a key or damage
to the lock), the issue was not how the lock was picked by the witness,
but rather whether the lock could be opened. It seems questionable,
however, whether the court was properly solicitous of respondent!s in-
terests when it upheld the exclusion of counsel from the demonstra-
tion; 7' absent a channel for public scrutiny, the examiner, while trying,
is no longer himself "under trial." 1 More significant for purposes of
7-3 See 8 J. WIGmoRE, supra note 25, § 2212 (3).
74 See, e.g., Basic Books, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 718, 720-21 (7th Cir. 1960);
Royal Constr. Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8690, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. 1 17,772 (1966).
75 143 F.2d 935, 937 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 791 (1945).
76See FTC Rules §3.41(c), 32 Fed. Reg. 8453 (1967); Administrative Pro-
cedure Act § 6(a), 5 U.S.C.A. § 555(b) (Supp. 11 1967). See also Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; DAvis, TRAvisE § 8.10.
77 See text accompanying note 13 supra.
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this analysis is the court's brief but explicit approval of in camera
FTC proceedings to protect compelled testimony relating to trade
secrets.
Following this seemingly blanket judicial approval of in camera
proceedings, FTC examiners readily authorized private sessions for
receiving confidential information.h The Commission appeared to
have adopted, without modification, judicial standards for recognizing
the trade secret privilege.7 9  Examiners were encouraged to seek agree-
ment by the parties on confidential treatment.8° Some courts, more-
over, seemed to be suggesting that the burden was on the Commission
to prove the propriety of public hearings when the privilege was
asserted.1
Thus, in the leading case of H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc.,8  the hear-
ing examiner, "upon motion of counsel for respondent and upon his
own initiative," 3 ordered that sales and pricing documents (ap-
parently obtained from respondent and offered by complaint counsel)
78 Hood, 58 F.T.C. at 1185; Dixon, Recent Developments in Federal Trade Com-
mission Enforcement, 18 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 107, 116 (1961) ("[T]he selec-
tive withholding of exhibits from the public record has been the practice in our ad-
judicative hearings for many years.") ; see Uarco, Inc., 58 F.T.C. 1168 (1961) (tabu-
lations of respondent's net sales in recent years classified by customer and by type-
i.e., below cost groupings).
79 That there is some privilege in the matter of divulging "trade secrets" is
well settled. This privilege extends, not merely to the chemical and physical
composition of substances employed and to the mechanical structure of tools
and machines, but also to such other facts of a possibly private nature as the
names of customers, the subjects and amounts of expense and the like. Wig-
more on Evidence, 3rd edition Volume 8 Section 2212.
The privilege is not an absolute one. Nor can the "public interest" be
automatically held up as an excuse for denying it, although it is always an
important consideration.
Maico Co., 51 F.T.C. 1197, 1202 (1955) (witnesses not required to disclose names
of customers or dollar amount of sales to each) ; cf. Pure Oil Co., 57 F.T.C. 1542,
1542-43 (1960) : The examiner was instructed
to determine whether there are practicable alternative means available to the
respondent to establish the ultimate facts it wishes to prove . . . , and if not,
to take appropriate steps, . . . to protect such witnesses against unnecessary
disclosure of private business information and, where such disclosure is neces-
sary, to impose suitable conditions of confidentiality.
8 0 Maico Co., 51 F.T.C. at 1203.
81 See FTC v. Bowman, 149 F. Supp. 624, 630-31 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 248 F.2d 456
(7th Cir. 1957) (business records of nonparty witness' production, sales, purchases,
patent agreements, prices and suppliers entitled to confidential treatment); FTC v.
Menzies, 145 F. Supp. 164, 171 (D. Md. 1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 957 (1957) (business records of sales to customers by respondent
in three metropolitan areas during recent 18-month period viewed as business secrets
entitled to confidential treatment).
82 58 F.T.C. 1184 (1961).
3Although two law review commentaries on Hood disagreed as to who re-
quested the in camera treatment, compare 60 Mica. L. REv. 647 (1962), with 46
MINN. L. REv. 778 (1962), the Commission's opinion indicates that some were sug-
gested by respondent's counsel and others by the examiner. Hood, 58 F.T.C. at 1184.
In addition, although the Michigan comment concludes that the FTC would treat manu-
facturing processes and customer lists identically, the Commission's opinion sets forth
different tests for according confidential treatment to these items. Id. at 1188-89.
See text accompanying notes 87-88 infra.
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be placed in evidence in camera. Upon complaint counsel's appeal, the
FTC called a halt to such broad secrecy and re-examined the treatment
of sensitive information at the hearing stage. Since the Commission's
recently adopted Rules of Practice incorporate this decision by refer-
ence,' it deserves extended consideration.
Recognizing the desirability of insuring that full meaning be given
to its "public" hearing standard, the Commission sharply restricted
those situations in which evidence would be received in camera. First,
it overruled the examiner's decision that the proponent of public treat-
ment shoulders the burden of persuasion,85 holding that the burden of
showing good cause for confidential treatment rests on the party re-
questing an in camera order8 Second, the Commission held that this
burden is satisfied only by demonstrating that public disclosure would
result in "clearly defined, serious injury to the person or corporation
whose records are involved." 11 Traditional trade secrets, such as
secret formulae, research and manufacturing processes, presumptively
meet the good cause requirement and normally would not require a
further showing of severe economic injury. On the other hand, busi-
ness records, such as customer lists, prices, business costs and profits,
would not merit the same degree of protection, and would be sealed
only "in exceptional circumstances upon a clear showing that an
irreparable injury will result from disclosure." 88 It is not clear, how-
ever, whether this latter requirement of "irreparable harm" is meant as
a modification of the generally applicable "serious injury" definition
of good cause. The opinion does not attempt to resolve this ambiguity
and indicates only that "serious injury" is something more detrimental
than mere embarrassment, a business desire to keep information con-
fidential or exposure to possible treble-damage actions for antitrust
violations.' Nor is the content of, or distinction between, these terms
84FTC Rules § 3.45(b), 32 Fed. Reg. 8454 (1967).85 "Neither party need show cause why evidence should be placed in the public
record since such placement is mandatory unless excused." Hood, 58 F.T.C. at 1188;
accord, FTC Rule §3.41(a), 32 Fed. Reg. 8452 (1967).
86In the case of data obtained from nonparties the Commission makes no
provision for notice to such nonparties that information they supplied will appear
on the public record. Cf. FTC Rules §§3.45(c), 4.11, 32 Fed. Reg. 8454 (1967).
However, if documents were secured by either party "upon the express condi-
tion that they would be placed 'in camerd, there is no room for the exercise
of any rule since good faith would demand that the condition be kept." Hood, 58
F.T.C. at 1190. But cf. Carnation Co., 52 F.T.C. 998, 1000 (1956). It is doubtful
whether this reference in Hood applies beyond the specific documents involved there,
since the Commission otherwise would no longer control in camera treatment of docu-
ments obtained by respondent from third persons.87 Hood, 58 F.T.C. at 1188 (emphasis added). Compare the FTC's definition
of "good cause" when the confidentiality of government documents are at stake. E.g.,
L. G. Balfour Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8435, 62 F.T.C. 1541, 1545-46 (1963).
8sHood, 58 F.T.C. at 1189 (emphasis added).89 1d. at 1189-90; see Publicity in Taking Evidence Act, 15 U.S.C. §30 (1964)
(evidence taken by deposition in Sherman Act injunction proceeding shall be open
to the public).
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suggested by examining the Commission's stated objectives in re-
stricting in camera evidence. Rather, the opposite seems to be true,
for none of the several reasons put forward by the Commission in
Hood " supports a distinction between the treatment of "trade secrets"
and "business information." In fact, the asserted justifications do not
support strict limitations on any confidential treatment.
First, the Commission suggested that public hearings and, ipso
facto, revelation of sensitive business information, have a greater de-
terrent effect on potential violators than do hearings where such data
are generously granted confidential status. But, to utilize public hear-
ings and to reveal trade secrets for such in terrorem purposes is grossly
inappropriate. Rather, confidential treatment of sensitive business in-
formation is necessary, at least until respondent has been adjudged
guilty of an unlawful practice, if respondent's right to a fair hearing
is not to be impaired.91 Second, a public record was asserted to be
necessary to guide those advising businessmen who seek to comply with
the law and to enable the public to familiarize itself with all aspects of
FTC hearings. 2  "Problems such as the formulation of an adequate
cost justification defense or the erection of a statistical rebuttal to an
inference of adverse competitive effect can only be solved by access to
the evidence in past cases." 13 But this argument exceeds its founda-
tion. In addition to the fact that, as a practical matter, Commission
records are inaccessible,94 revelation of names of customers or specific
90 58 F.T.C. at 1186-87.
91 An analogy from criminal procedure is instructive here. (For the relevance
of fairness requirements developed in criminal cases to administrative proceedings,
see the application of Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), to administrative
agencies, note 149 infra and accompanying text.) The use of similar in terrorem
techniques to restrict an accused's exercise of his constitutional rights has been con-
demned. For example, it has been held that the possible imposition on a criminal
defendant of a harsher sentence upon retrial and conviction for the same offense
(following reversal of the first sentence because of constitutional error) is an uncon-
stitutional condition on his right to a fair trial. See Patton v. North Carolina, 381
F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 36 U.S.L.W. 3295 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1968);
Marano v. United States, 374 F.d 583 (1st Cir. 1967). Contra, United States ex rel.
Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 808 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 88 S. Ct. 166 (1967) ; New-
man v. Rodriguiz, 375 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. White, 382 F.2d
445 (7th Cir. 1967). See generally Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penal-
ties and the "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606 (1965). Similarly,
the Commission's policy, as justified, seems to be an improper attempt to deter re-
spondent and potential respondents, by threat of indiscriminate disclosure of its business
secrets, from using his right to present his case at a fair hearing. See also Graber
Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, 223 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (D.D.C. 1963).
92As further justification, Chairman Dixon has also suggested that, without
substantially public records, a legislative committee's attempt to evaluate the FTC's
enforcement program would be like "working in a vacuum." Dixon, supra note 78.
However, just how the sealing of sales and pricing data in the Hood case, for example,
would frustrate legislative review was not spelled out.
93 Hood, 58 F.T.C. at 1186.
9 4 See note 65 supra. Even those Washington law firms involved almost daily
in FTC hearings find it virtually impossible to use FTC records. See, e.g., Brief
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sales and profit figures, for example, adds nothing in terms of guidance
to a respondent otherwise faced with a complete, but less specific, non-
confidential record. Disclosure of sensitive business information would
be of little help here. Rather, the methodology of establishing a cost
justification defense needs to be properly explained by the Commis-
sion." The third justification seems equally defective. Proceedings
often require disclosure of confidential data from competitors as well
as respondent. Since the parties (including respondent) may examine
the evidence, the Commission concluded that wholesale in camera
treatment of sensitive information unfairly advantages respondent, who
is likely a lawbreaker; if confidential treatment is allowed, respondent
is apprised of its competitors' material, but similar data from re-
spondent and other competitors is hidden from respondent's com-
petitors." But the proper response to this potential injury to re-
spondent's competitors is not to increase the injury to such competitors
by exposure of information to all other competitors as well as to re-
spondent; nor should the Commission increase respondent's injuries by
broad disclosure of its sensitive information. Rather, it would be
fairer and wiser to impose careful limitations on respondent's access to
or use of confidential information.97
The Commission formula is also open to other questions. Is the
distinction between "serious injury" and "irreparable harm" one of
permanence, of severity or of something else? " Is not the lack of a
presumption of serious injury from revelation of business records and
the requirement that the party seeking in camera treatment carry the
burden of persuasion a hurdle sufficient to insure that needless secrecy
of Respondent at 6, H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 7709 (filed before
Hearing Examiner Jan. 28, 1960):
Unfortunately, there is no digest of all rulings of FTC examiners on requests
for more definite statements-at least none that is available to counsel for
respondent. The examples given above are simply matters that have come
to the attention of counsel in this case and some involved cases handled by
the law firm representing respondent in the instant case. Consequently, the
citation of isolated cases to the contrary that may be known to counsel in
support of a complaint can hardly demonstrate a lack of power on the part
of the Hearing Examiner.
The author, having spent several days attempting to review Commission files on
confidentiality cases, can attest to the unrealistic nature of the Commission's available
records argument.
05 FTC v. Standard Motor Prods., Inc., 371 F.2d 613, 619-20, 622 (2d Cir. 1967).
19 Relying on § 5(b) of the FTC Act, a competitor could seek to intervene in
the proceedings as a third party and thus obtain the confidential information. 15
U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964); see FTC Rules § 3.14, 32 Fed. Reg. 8450 (1967). But inter-
vention is not of right and rests in the Commission's discretion "upon good cause
shown." Moreover, it has seldom, if ever, been used. See, e.g., L. G. Balfour Co.,
FTC Dkt No. 8435, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,793 (1966) ;
Berger Watch Co., 56 F.T.C. 1655 (1959). But see Florida Citrus Mutual, 53 F.T.C.
973, 975 (1957); cf. L. G. Balfour Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8435 (Dec. 27, 1967).
9 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
!D 46 MiNN. L. REv. 778, 783 (1962).
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will be avoided? * What of the potential cost to the Commission (and
hence to the public) of non-confidential treatment: will business refuse
to supply such information willingly, thereby increasing the need to
utilize compulsory process?" And has sufficient consideration been
given to alternatives by which adequate protection of confidential data
could be assured while maintaining a complete record? Before con-
sidering any alternative, however, the Commission's actual experience
under the Hood rule should be reviewed for answers to these questions.
The reported cases decided since Hood dealing with confidential
information at the hearing stage demonstrate that the FTC has made
substantial strides in protecting the rule of public hearings from
in camera erosion. 1" All of these cases involved the confidentiality of
sales and pricing data; apparently examiners either seldom face ques-
tions of traditional trade secrets or these decisions are not questioned by
either party. On the other hand, despite a contrary classification in
Hood,1 2 current overall or branch sales, 03 sales per customer,'0°
prices "5 and profit or loss statements 10 in practice have been
granted presumptive in camera treatment. The definition of current
99 Id. at 784-85.
10060 MicE. L. REv. 647, 650 (1962); BNA, ANTTRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
No. 20, B-3 (Nov. 28, 1961). Although the Commission does not appear to have
been unduly hampered by lack of business cooperation in the past six years, this may
be attributable to a failure to enforce the Hood formula, rather than to its wisdom.
See note 109 infra and accompanying text.
10 1 See Diamond Alkali Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8572 (Hearing Examiner Order
Aug. 30, 1963) (denying motion for confidential treatment of subpoenaed information,
and noting that, if a clear showing of irreparable injury is demonstrated, information
offered in evidence will be received in camera) ; H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., FTC Dkt.
No. 7709 (Hearing Examiner Order June 8, 1961), interlocutory appeal denied,
(Comm'n Order July 21, 1961) ; Sperry Rand Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 7559, [1961-1963
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 15,468 (Hearing E: aminer Order 1961), per-
inission to file interlocutory appeal denied, [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
RE'. 15,569 (1961).
The Commission, however, does not apply the Hood rule to discovery proceedings,
since data secured in this manner are not yet placed on the public record. National
Dairy Prods. Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8548, [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. 1 16,778 (1964) (information obtained by subpoena). Contra, Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8463, [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1 16,438
(Hearing Examiner Order 1963) (transcript of deposition taken with aid of FTC
subpoena).
'
0 2 See text accompanying note 88 supra.
103 H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 7709 (Hearing Examiner Order
June 8, 1961) (privately held corporation) ; see Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt.
No. 8687 (Comm'n Opinion June 26, 1967) (approving in dictum examiner's ruling
reserving his decision as to current sales data) ; National Tea Co., FTC Dkt. No. 7453,
[1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1 17,463, at 22,699 (1966). But see
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., FTC Dkt No. 8512, 3 TRADE REG. RE'. ff 18,037,
at 20,459 (1967).
104See Graber Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, 223 F. Supp. 1020 (D.D.C. 1963).
10 5 See id.; National Tea Co., FTC Dkt. No. 7453, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. 1 17,463, at 22,699 (1966).
106 H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 7709 (Hearing Examiner Order
June 8, 1961); National Tea Co., FTC Dkt. No. 7453, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. 1 17,463, at 22,699 (1966).
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financial data deserving confidential protection, however, has not been
treated consistently. In one case, sales data ranging in age from two
and one-half to six and one-half years were denied in camera protection,
even though submitted by a nonparty witness whose request for con-
fidentiality was not opposed by either party."7 In another case, the
Commission did not disturb an examiner's confidential treatment of
seven-year-old price and sales figures."' But it seems clear that,
despite constant reiteration by the FTC that the Hood rule controls,
the Commission has followed the lead of a federal district court in
dropping the "irreparable injury" test for ordinary business records.109
Instead, the test now applied by the Commission to requests for con-
fidential protection of business records and trade secrets is whether
public disclosure will cause a "clearly defined, serious injury." And,
as noted above, where such records are current, serious injury is
readily found.
Despite the correctness of most Commission decisions concerning
confidential treatment of sensitive information at the hearing stage,
107 Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687 (Comm'n Opinion June 26,
1967).
108 National Tea Co., FTC Dkt. No. 7453, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. 17,463, at 22,699 (1966). The Commission's action in Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8512, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 18,037, at 20,459
(1967), provides a vivid contrast On reviewing the merits there, the FTC commented,
although the opinion does not indicate that either party raised the issue, on the im-
propriety of in camera orders regarding past sales data and record club membership
figures of respondent and nonparty witnesses.
109 In Graber Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, 223 F. Supp. 1020 (D.D.C. 1963), plaintiff, in
its affidavit, contended that an exhibit estimating its net dollar volume sales to a
major customer for 1961 should be received in camera because
accurate information as to a competitors [sic] success or failure with a par-
ticular product, or in a particular market area may save untold dollars in
research, development, and marketing, and allow a direct benefit from the
expense and experience of the competitor. Information as to a competitors
[sic] declining sales or financial strength, or the number of service and
repair personnel in an area, is a potent weapon in diverting customers to
one's own product or service.
Id. at 1022. Complaint counsel conceded the need for confidential treatment of sales
figures, but asserted that plaintiff need not be so secretive as to four years of previous
sales. (How this period was arrived at seems unexplainable; the net sales were
estimated here because 1961 was the current year at the time of the hearings.) The
examiner felt bound by the Hood irreparable injury rule for business records, even
though competitors would seek this information. The court pointed out, however,
that "proof of irreparable injury, which would be difficult under any circumstances
concerning competitive use of business information, may be next to impossible before
the Commission." Id. at 1022-23. Since plaintiff had shown a "clearly defined and
serious injury" to his business, the court held that it had "good cause" for keeping
the information confidential.
In Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687 (Comm'n Opinion June 26, 1967),
the Commission refused to grant in camera status to old, or at least aging, sales data
(i.e., ordinary business records) because the nonparty witnesses had not demonstrated
how "exposure even to the prying eyes of competitors will result in the clearly defined
and serious injury required by the criteria set forth in H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. . ...
Id. at 2. Nowhere in the Commission's opinion is reference made to the irreparable
injury test which Hood seemingly would have required here. Hence, it seems fair
to conclude that the FTC will no longer require a showing of probable irreparable
harm by a party seeking confidential treatment for business records.
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three problems stand out. First, the Commission has extended, rather
than corrected, the erroneous analysis set forth in Hood. Unwarranted
disclosure of confidential information unfortunately has resulted.
Second, the FTC's treatment of confidential information at the hearing
stage continues to be an inflexible all-or-nothing approach and less
rigid alternatives have not been explored. Third, the Commission has
been remiss in not developing meaningful content for the "serious
injury" test by which hearing examiners are to determine whether
material should be received in camera. Six years have elapsed since
the rule was announced; this is too long a period to excuse continued
failure to define the standard.
The Commission's gratuitous comments in Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc.,"n apparently issued to guide hearing examiners, are a
current example of the FTC's reliance on untenable arguments. Al-
though the argument is more sophisticated than the straight-forward
punitive position in Hood,"' it has no greater merit. In CBS, the
Commission indicated (apparently without acting) that the examiner
erroneously had received sales data and record club membership figures
in camera. Its conclusion rested on the following analysis:
Competition depends for its continuing vitality upon free
entry and free exit to and from industries, and entry depends
in no small measure upon knowledge of opportunities, i.e.,
knowledge of sales volumes, of probable costs, and of esti-
mated profits. The public interest lies in encouraging entry,
not in protecting the barriers erected around industries by
established firms, whether these be knowledge barriers or
other kinds."
But hearings are held to determine whether respondent has engaged
in any unlawful practices. By using its trial hearings as a weapon to
punish alleged offenders through the spreading of business secrets on
the public record, the Commission subverts the true purpose of
hearings as a method for gathering evidence to ascertain the facts to
which the law will be applied. Commission hearings become, in fact,
penalty proceedings wherein the unlucky respondent is punished by
the mere taking of evidence, regardless of the examiner's or Com-
11o FTC Dkt. No. 8512, 3 TRADE REG. RE'. 18,037, at 20,459 (1967). There
is no indication in the Commission's opinion (the record was not available for public
inspection as of August 1967) that the question of confidentiality was raised before
the FTC. Moreover, the Commission's order, dated July 25, 1967, makes no reference
to Commissioner Dixon's opinion that certain exhibits were placed in canera im-
properly. Thus, despite the Commission ruling, these documents apparently have not
been put on the public record.
"'1See text accompanying note 91 supra.
"2 Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., FTC Dit. No. 8512, 3 TRADE RE. REP.
18,037, at 20,459 (1967).
422 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
mission's subsequent decision on the merits. Even an innocent non-
party witness suffers from the application of this theory to compel
disclosure of business information, despite the Commission's conces-
sion that "no demonstrable benefit accrues from disclosure." 113
If the only alternative was between a silent and, perhaps, meaning-
less public record or full disclosure, one might be more sympathetic to
the Commission. However, a simpler expedient is available to protect
the FTC's concern about incomplete records, while also preventing un-
warranted disclosure. The party seeking in camera treatment could
be required to prepare a non-confidential summary of the document or
testimony for inclusion in the public record." 4 Thus, the hiatus in
the record would be filled for the bar, legislative committee or scholarly
critic. Of course, not every in camera document would lend itself to
such summarization, nor would it be necessary in every case; but,
where helpful, it ought to be considered.
Moreover, the Commission's rigid approach to confidential in-
formation at the hearing stage is not the result of an inexorable con-
gressional command. As previously noted, the FTC has always had
broad discretion in its handling of confidential information." 5 Perhaps
the new FTC rule providing that in camera orders shall henceforth
include a date on which in camera treatment will expire,"' portends a
more realistic approach to requests for confidential treatment.
The Commission's failure to give content to the "serious injury"
standard is another example for Judge Friendly's catalogue of adminis-
trative agency failures to define and clarify general standards." 7  An
analysis of the facts of FTC cases involving sensitive business data
suggests that for a fair resolution of a business secret claim, an ex-
aminer should consider (and a party seeking a protective order should
113 Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687 (Comm'n Opinion June 26,
1967). But cf. FTC v. Bowman, 149 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Ill.), affd, 248 F.2d 456
(7th Cir. 1957).
114 For example, sales, prices and profit figures are often included in the FTC
proceedings to show the effect of certain activities on a firm's competitive position
or to show that price discounts were cost justified. The exact figures need not be
included in the record to make it meaningful, since it is only the relationship shown
by these figures that is significant; hence, a summary stating, for example, that
"exhibit X or testimony at sealed pages 1-30 shows that A's growth rate from 1961
to 1962 was 10% and that it moved from 4th to 2nd place in the industry," or that
"A sold its products in store 1 at a loss and in its remaining stores at a 15% profit,"
would seem sufficient.
115 See notes 58-64 mtpra and accompanying text.
116FTC Rules § 3.45(b), 32 Fed. Reg. 8454 (1967). The rules, however, do not
contain any self-enforcing provision by which expired in camera materials can be
placed in the public record. And FTC Rules § 3.45(c), id., specifies that application
must normally be made to the Commission pursuant to FTC Rules. § 4.11, id. at
8459, to obtain release of in camera evidence.
11 7 See H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADAINiSTRATnE AGENCIES 14 (1962). Other
than its general recognition that current sales and price data will usually satisfy the
"serious injury" criterion, the FTC has not been more explicit than its negative
definition recounted in the text accompanying note 89 supra.
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present evidence on) the following factors in determining whether
disclosure will cause serious injury: 118
1. How many people have knowledge of the supposedly
"secret" information? Will disclosure increase that number
to a significant degree?
2. Does the contested information have any value to the
possessor? To a competitor? Is that value substantial?
3. Did the party possessing the information incur any ex-
pense in its development? Has he had a sufficient oppor-
tunity to realize an adequate return on that investment?
4. What damage, if any, would the possessor of the secret
suffer from its disclosure? What advantages would his
competitors reap from disclosure?
5. What benefits are likely to flow from disclosure? To
whom? Are they significant? In this connection, what is
the public "need" for disclosure? Can it be satisfied in any
other way?
6. What is the relationship of the possessor of the informa-
tion from whom disclosure is being sought to the FTC
proceeding? "
Government Secrets
The privilege applied by the courts, under the rubric of govern-
ment secrets, is designed to protect information in the government's
possession from harmful disclosure. 20 This privilege is particularly
significant in FTC proceedings, since the government, as complainant,
is always a party, and when information in the FTC's possession is
sought, the question of privilege invariably is raised. Moreover, in
contradistinction to the other privileges considered here, government
secrets involve more than private rights. Trade secrets and attorney-
client privileges, for example, protect private interests and relationships,
and those claiming these privileges have no obligation other than to
their own interests. The government secrets privilege, while it protects
the government's interest in withholding information, is, in addition,
subject to the constitutional requirement that adjudicative proceedings
18 See Note, 64 IIARv. L. REv. 976, 977-78 (1951). See also RESTATEMENT OI
TORTS § 757, comment c (1939).
119 In accord with this author's earlier criticism of the Commission's transforming
the evidence-taking aspect of hearings into punishment, see text accompanying note
113 supra, it does seem appropriate to suggest that the Commission owes nonparty
witnesses even greater protection from injury than it owes respondent. The testi-
monial duty may compel disclosure of information in the hearing; it should not,
however, be turned into a license to ruin or injure the witness' business.
1 See generally C. McCoRmicK, EViDENCF, ch. 15 (1954) ; 8 J. WGmoRE, Evi-
DEIcE §§ 2367-79 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
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meet standards of procedural due process.' The government's asser-
tion of the privilege, if it is to be properly recognized by the court,
must be consistent with the government's obligation that "justice be
done." 122 Hence, one of the prerequisites of a fair trial where the
government is the complainant would seem to be that the government
disclose to the respondent information which may exculpate him or
substantially aid his defense." Thus, in considering an assertion of
the privilege, the court must balance the respective needs of the govern-
ment and the respondent, and must evaluate whether the evidence to
be suppressed would substantially aid the defense. 24
The government secrets privilege is generally applicable to three
categories of information or relationships: the state secrets privilege
which protects the government against having to reveal military or
diplomatic information; 125 the executive privilege which is asserted to
justify an executive official's refusal to appear and testify; 126 and the
121 Carrow, Governmental Nondisclosure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. PA. L.
Rxv. 166, 169-70 (1958); see, e.g., FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S.
134, 143-44 (1940). See also FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 291 (1965).122 Communist Party of the United States v. SACB., 254 F.2d 314, 328 (D.C.
Cir. 1958); see Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). As stated in an
inscription at the Department of Justice: "The United States wins its point whenever
justice is done its citizens in the courts." (quoted in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963)).
123 A recent Supreme Court decision in a criminal case indicates that procedural
due process imposes an expanded duty upon the prosecution to disclose such evidence.
See Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967). See also Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66
(1967) ; Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard, 1964 DUKE
L.J. 477; Note, 74 YALE L.J. 136 (1964). The command of fairness was summarized
by the Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963), as follows:
A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if
made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape
a trial that bears heavily on the defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the
role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of
justice, even though . . . his action is not "the result of guile," . . . .
1A Since the common-law evidential privilege of the government may thus
be offset by a duty to provide fair procedure, can an agency's claim of a right
to withhold information be reconciled with the requirement of procedural
due process?
It is not, in fact, easily reconciled. The best that so far has been said
in support of nondisclosure is that "reasonable" limitations can and have been
imposed on both substantive and procedural rights of due process. If this
criterion is accepted, the problem in this area is to break down and define
what are reasonable limitations.
Carrow, supra note 121, at 170.
125 See generallyZagel, The State Secrets Privilege, 50 Mil. . L. Rzv. 875 (1966).
Technically, state secrets go beyond mere privilege because it has been held at least
once that the government may be required to withhold information it is willing to
produce. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876).
12o See generally Hardin, Executive Privilege in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE
LJ. 879 & n.1 (1962) (authorities collected). Dean Wigmore contended, however,
that the privilege exempted the executive only from attendance at judicial proceedings,
not from supplying information. 8 J. WIGMoPE, supra note 120, §§ 2369-70. In
addition to the evidentiary privilege, executive refusal to disclose information has
rested on the separation of powers doctrine and on obscure "housekeeping" provisions
of general statutes. See, e.g., Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Un-
resolved Constitutional Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477 (1957); Mitchell, Government
Secrecy in Theory and Practice: "Rules and Regulations" as an Autonomous Screen,
58 CoLum. L. R-v. 199 (1958).
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omnibus exception which is asserted to prevent disclosure of official
government information, 2 7 running the gamut from the identity of
informers and internal management materials, to-ftaff studies un-
related to particular litigation.
FTC problems have arisen primarily with regard to the last
category of government secrets: Commission proceedings generally do
not involve military or diplomatic information which must be classified
for reasons of national security; ' nor do questions of executive
privilege arise at the hearing stage, because the hearing examiner
cannot order the appearance of Commission personnel or officers."
In any case, requests for testimony by FTC staff, as well as production
of materials from FTC files, are treated by the Commission as dis-
covery requests, thus obscuring the fact that the Commission has
altered the usual evidentiary rule and placed the burden on the party
seeking disclosure. 3 '
In general, the FTC has protected its files from disclosure to re-
spondents on the grounds that across-the-board confidentiality is
necessary to assure the integrity of the administrative process or that
the data are within the protective confines of the work product doc-
trine.-3 ' A major exception, which developed as experience was
gained under the continuous hearing requirement, is that documents
to be placed in evidence by Commission counsel must generally be
disclosed in advance of the trial. 3 2 Thus, materials in complaint
counsel's possession which will be used in the presentation of his case
1 27 
UNIFORMa RuLE OF EVIDENCE 34; 8 J. WIGmoRE, sitpra note 120, §§ 2374, 2378.
128 In response to a congressional inquiry, the FTC stated that it never classified
information for security reasons. However, it does designate documents "Confidential"
and "For staff use only" to prevent public dissemination. SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION OF THE HousE COMM. ON GOv'T OPERATIONS, 84TH CONG.,
IST SEss., REPLIEs FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES TO QUESTIONNAIRE 207 (Comm. Print
1955).
129FTC Rules § 3.36, 32 Fed. Reg. 8452 (1967); see § 3.34, id. at 8459. FTC
commissioners, of course, are not subject to being called as witnesses, although this
point appears never to have been raised or disputed before the Commission. The
Supreme Court's ruling, however, that the internal processes of an agency's decision-
making cannot be probed, suggests this result. See United States v. Morgan, 313
U.S. 409 (1941). But cf. 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 105 (1957).
And, if other FTC personnel are subpoenaed, the Commission itself determines
whether they shall appear and the scope of their testimony. FTC Rules §§ 3.34, 3.36,
supra. See School Services, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8729, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 18,064
(1967).
I30 See School Services, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8729, 3 TRADE REG. RE'. f118,064
(1967). Compare L. G. Balfour Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8435, [1961-1963 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. f 16,423 (1963), with R. H. Macy & Co., FTC Dkt. No.
8650, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. f 17,344 (1965). Hence, extended
examination of FTC treatment of the government secrets privilege is more appro-
priate when considering confidentiality at the discovery stage.
1'1 See, e.g., Sperry & Hutchinson Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8671, [1965-1967 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. f1 17,505 (1966), aff'd, 256 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ;
School Services, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8729, 3 TRADE REG. RE,. f 17,978 (1967).
132 E.g., Grand Union Co., 63 F.T.C. 1491 (1963).
426 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.116:401
are not confidential, even though they are in government files.138
Apart from this exception, the FTC rulings have tended to adopt a
policy of blanket protection of government files, thus making the
testimonial duty the exception rather than the rule. Placing the
burden of showing good cause for disclosure 134 on the party seeking
the evidence (that is, respondent), rather than on the party seeking
to suppress the evidence (that is, complaint counsel), is contrary to
FTC rulings applied in connection with all other privileges '35 and to
judicial rulings on most government secrets. 36
On the other hand, in the process of converting questions on the
confidentiality of government information into problems of discovery,
the FTC has given the term "good cause" a wholly new and more
liberal meaning; rather than requiring a clearly defined and serious
injury, "good cause" in this context merely requires a showing by re-
spondent that the "material sought is relevant and useful for defensive
purposes . . . [and] would not impair any overriding public interest.
,, 137 This easing of respondent's burden in demonstrating
"good cause," however, hardly justifies the Commission approach of
placing this burden on respondent, rather than complaint counsel. Nor
has the Commission ever satisfactorily explained why this burden
need be so placed at all. In fact, the Commission seems unaware that
it is contrary to other precedent and to the theory of evidentiary
privilege as an exception to the testimonial duty imposed on everyone.
Certainly it is not a necessary result of considering questions of the
confidentiality of government secrets at the discovery, rather than the
hearing stage-although that probably explains the origins of the
FTC approach.
Moreover, the reasons for restoring the burden to complaint
counsel seem compelling. First, to be consistent with its public
hearing requirement, the Commission should emphasize its commitment
to full disclosure of all relevant evidence. It is those seeking to limit
133FTC Rules §3.36(a), 32 Fed. Reg. 8452 (1967); see Seeburg Corp., FTC
Dkt. No. 8682 (Interlocutory Order Mar. 27, 1967); Viviano Macaroni Co., FTC
Dkt. No. 8666, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,467 (1966) ; Furr's,
Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8581 (Interlocutory Order Nov. 18, 1963); cf. Texas Indus.,
Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8656, [1967-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,253
(1965). But cf. Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8687 (Interlocutory Order
Feb. 8, 1967).
134 FTC Rules § 3.36, 32 Fed. Reg. 8452 (1967); § 4.11, id. at 8454.
135 E.g., Hood, 58 F.T.C. 1184 (1961) ; Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC Dkt. No.
8687 (Conm'n Opinion June 26, 1967).
136 See, e.g., 8 J. WiGmoRE, EvI ENcE §§ 2378-79 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
Concern for the disclosure of secret data, however, has resulted in the ruling that
the burden is met when the head of the executive department asserts "that compulsion
of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security,
should not be divulged." United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
137 L. G. Balfour Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8435, [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TADE
Rwa. REP. 16,423, at 21,294 (1963).
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the testimonial duty who should be required to prove their case; if all
considerations balance out, the government secrets privilege should
fail, not prevail. Second, since the FTC both prosecutes and judges
its own complaints, every effort should be made to maintain both fair-
ness and the appearance of fairness.lm Switching the burden to re-
spondent without apparent justification and to respondent's distinct
disadvantage lends an unnecessarily suspect aura to FTC proceedings.
Third, it is almost impossible to prove why a document or particular
testimony should be disclosed, without first having seen the document
or heard the testimony. Complaint counsel, however, would not have
this problem, since whoever represents the Commission's "govern-
mental" interest usually will have seen the material and, therefore, will
be able to demonstrate why disclosure is unwarranted. Placing this
burden on the Commission's representative hardly can be considered
either unfair or unduly burdensome. Fourth, reversing the burden
would encourage the FTC to develop standards for the confidential
treatment of government secrets. Under the present arrangement, the
Commission is able to rely on generalities-such as that respondent
has not shown "real or actual need" or that respondent has not made
a supported "claim that the documents are necessary to its defense" 139_
which provide little guidance as to the standards governing disclosure.
The inevitable result to date has been excessive appeals and seemingly
unnecessary delays. Requiring the FTC to spell out its basis for
confidential treatment would not necessarily expedite hearings, but
might result in fewer demands being made. Finally, if reversal of the
burden required the FTC to examine the document or be apprised of the
testimony, it would have an opportunity to determine whether the mate-
rial was of the kind that must be disclosed as helpful to the defense. At
present, decisions are often made without such knowledge'40 and,
lacking such information, the Commission is unable to implement
improved standards of fairness. 41
138 [W]here executive, legislative and judicial powers are blended in a single
agency's activity, the resulting need [is] for adherence to scrupulous standards
of fairness . . . . Public acceptance of agency decisions is not unrelated to
the giving of satisfaction in these regards.
S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 128 (1963) ; see Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC
Dkt. No. 8687 (Interlocutory Order Feb. 8, 1967) (dissenting opinion).
139 Viviano Macaroni Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8666, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. 1 17,467, at 22751 (1966). For a telling criticism of the result
reached in this case, see the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Elman in Inter-State
Builders, Inc., FTC Dkt No. 8624; L. G. Balfour Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8435, [1965-
1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. R. . 1 17,532, at 22,820 (1966).
140 Statesman Life Ins. Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8686, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. 1f 17,790, at 23,148 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
141An additional difficulty has been the Commission's avoidance of questions
involving plenary review of its treatment of confidential information or of complaint
counsel's obligation to reveal material helpful to the defense. For example, during
hearings before an examiner in Seeburg Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8682 (1966), the question
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PRIOR STATEMENTS OF A PROSECUTION WITNESS
One final problem at the hearing stage involves the rule that the
prosecution must disclose prior statements of a government witness.
Here, again, the Commission is faced with a conflict between its duty
to disclose and the need to protect confidential files.
In Jencks v. United States,"4 a criminal case, the Supreme Court
held that, at trial, the defendant was entitled to inspect prior statements
by the witness relating to his testimony. Relying on its powers to
control adjudicatory procedures, the Court required disclosure, whether
or not the witness' testimony was inconsistent with his prior state-
ments.' In rejecting claims that the prosecution, as well as the
defense, should be entitled to prepare its case free from the need to
disclose its working papers and that these statements were privileged
and confidential, the Court recognized the overriding importance of
the right of cross-examination in a criminal trial and the government's
special obligation to seek justice, not victories."4 However, in re-
sponse to misconceived criticism, originating with Justice Clark's
vigorous dissent that the Jencks decision would result in wholesale dis-
closure of law enforcement files to criminals, 45 Congress passed modi-
fying legislation. The so-called "Jencks Act" 141 provides that "prior
statements" can be disclosed only after the witness has testified on
direct examination and limits the definition of "prior statements" to
(1) those written or adopted by the witness or (2) "substantially
arose as to whether complaint counsel had suppressed material, "confidential" evidence.
In certifying the question to the Commission, the examiner boldly stated complaint
counsel's duty. Complaint counsel, he suggested, is a public official who has "an
ethical and public interest obligation to inform the hearing officer of evidence not
adduced which would change the interpretation of the evidence adduced if considered
in context therewith." Certificate of Hearing Examiner to FTC at 1 (Feb. 3, 1967) ;
cf. cases cited note 123 supra. Subsequently, the questions certified to the Commission
were limited to one document, because complaint counsel altered his position and made
all but two of the contested documents available. Partial Withdrawal of Certification
by Hearing Examiner to FTC (Feb. 10, 1967). In ruling that the remaining docu-
ment should be disclosed to respondent, the Commission declined respondent's request
for plenary consideration of FTC policies as to its confidential files and made no
comment on the scope of complaint counsel's "ethical and public interest obligations."
Interlocutory Order (Mar. 27, 1967).
142 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
143 To demand that the defendant prove a variance would effectively deny the
right. Unless the witness admits the inconsistency, an unlikely occurrence, the de-
fendant is unable to know or discover the conflict without inspecting the statement.
Id. at 666-68.
344 The Court also approved the rationale that initiation of the criminal prose-
cution constitutes an automatic waiver of the privilege which would otherwise protect
government secrets essential to the defense. If the government continues to assert
the privilege, the action must be dismissed. Id. at 670-71; see United States v.
Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946) ; United States v. Andoloschek, 142 F.2d 503(2d Cir. 1944).
145 See Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 674, 680-82 (1958).
14 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964).
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verbatim" transcriptions which were recorded "contemporaneously."
The Act also provides for judicial in camera examination of the state-
ments prior to disclosure, to insure that disclosure is limited to relevant
statements; and the government is allowed the option of striking a
witness' testimony to avoid production.
In the decade since its hurried passage, the Act has occasioned
considerable confusion and delay in criminal trials.147 It remains un-
clear, moreover, whether developing constitutional standards of due
process will permit the Act's limitations to stand in criminal cases.'
In any event, the courts have begun applying Jencks principles to
administrative agency proceedings.149 Initially, it was unclear whether
the Commission would adhere to the rule outlined by the Supreme
Court or the Act.' The Commission was bound by neither rule, of
course, since both were limited on their face to criminal trials. This
issue was resolved by the FTC in Ernest Mark High,'5' where the
FTC reversed its long-established position of denying production of
government witness statements' 52 and applied the doctrine to its pro-
ceedings.153  Specifically ruling that it would "follow the substance of
147Judicial Conference of the Second Judicial Circuit, The Problems of Long
Criminal Trials, 34 F.R.D. 155, 168-69 (1963) ; Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. R-v. 1133 (1963).
148 Although the Court's holding in Jencks was not put on constitutional grounds,
and the Jencks Act has been upheld against constitutional attack, Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203, 257-58 (1961), it is also true that constitutional commands
were "close to the surface of the [Jencks] decision . . . ." Palermo v. United States,
360 U.S. 343, 362-63, 365 (1959) (concurring opinion of Brennan, J., joined by
Warren, C.J., Black & Douglas, JJ.). Hence, Commissioner Elman has speculated
that, in order to save the Act from constitutional attack, the distinctions between the
Jencks decision and Act may disappear. See Inter-State Builders, Inc., FTC Dkt.
No. 8624, L. G. Balfour Co., FTC Dit. No. 8453, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP,. f" 17,532, at 22,817 (dissenting opinion: citing Campbell v. United States,
373 U.S. 487 (1963)); cf. Keeffe, Jincks and Jencks, 7 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 91 (1958).
But see Note, 16 STAr. L. Rav. 1035, 1045 & n.59 (1964).
-149NLRB v. Adhesive Prods. Corp., 258 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1958); Communist
Party of the United States v. SACB, 254 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
150 See Comment, 4 Vr.L. L. REV. 366, 374 (1959).
151 56 F.T.C. 625 (1959). The charge that the Commission did not specify until
Inter-State Builders, lw., whether the Jencks case, the Act or some modification
would apply, 13 How. L.J. 197, 200 (1967), seems unfair. See note 154 infra.
152E.g., Trade Union Courier Publishing Corp., 51 F.T.C. 1275, 1298-99 (1955).
The Commission, in fact, adhered to this position after issuance of the Jencks decision
and passage of the Act, although it appeared to recognize the principle that prior
statements should be produced on demand. See Columbus Coated Fabrics Corp.,
54 F.T.C. 1885 (1957), 55 F.T.C. 1500, 1526-28 (1959) (production limited to
nonprivileged material) ; Pure Oil Co., 54 F.T.C. 1892, 1895 (1958) (production of
statement prepared by FTC attorney denied because privileged and hearsay).
153The Commission's decision in Ernest Mark High, 56 F.T.C. 625 (1959), is
often cited as the FTC's initial adoption of the Jencks doctrine. E.g., Inter-State
Builders, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8624, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,532, at 22,799 n.1; R. H. Macy & Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8650, [1965-1967 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,458 (1966). Actually, the FTC's first explicit appli-
cation of the doctrine came in Sun Oil Co., FTC Dkt. No. 6934 (Interlocutory Order
Sept. 15, 1958); accord, Washington Crab Ass'n, FTC Dkt. No. 7859, [1961-1963
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. f 15,850 (Hearing Examiner Order 1962). This
may have caused some confusion among hearing examiners. See Consumer Labora-
tories, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8199, [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
15,800 (Hearing Examiner Order 1962)."
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the Jencks statute," the Commission held that an FTC agent's sum-
marization of a government witness' prior oral statement need not be
produced, but that a writing prepared by the witness himself must be
disclosed to respondent on demand following direct examination. 54
If there is doubt as to the nature of the report, the Commission ruled
that it should be revealed only after the examiner has determined that
the statement complies with these requirements. Rules of privilege,
hearsay or work product would not protect reports that met these
standards.' 5 Subsequent decisions have filled in additional details.
Thus, respondent's request must be made during the hearing,l55 the
evidence must disclose the existence of the statement 15' and statements
by non-witnesses, even though favorable to the defense, need not be
disclosed."5  Complaint counsel has the option of complying with the
order to produce or, upon refusal to do so, of having the examiner
strike the witness' testimony.159
Nevertheless, as in the criminal area, questions concerning the
production of Jencks-type statements have resulted in numerous ap-
peals and considerable delay. During the past two years, for example,
154 [I]f the fundamentals of fair play require the production of documents in
an administrative proceeding pursuant to the ruling in the Jeiwks case, those
same fundamentals also dictate that we should follow the substance of a
statute designed to overcome interpretations leading to unfairness in the
other extreme.
Considering the statute, we observe that the Supreme Court has inter-
preted it to encompass more than mere automatic reproductions of oral state-
ments. Nevertheless, the Court has also stated that summaries of oral state-
ments which evidence substantial selection of material, or which are prepared
after the interview without the aid of complete notes, and hence rest on the
memory of the agent, or statements which merely contain agents' interpreta-
tions or impressions, are not to be produced. Commission interview reports
ordinarily are in the category of agents' summarizations. We believe that
where there is doubt as to the nature of the report, the examiner should
inspect it and make a determination ...
The writings prepared by the witnesses themselves obviously come in
a different category. Four witnesses testified as to writing letters or pre-
paring some kind of statement concerning the events about which they testi-
fied. These statements should have been produced in the circumstances shown.
Ernest ark High, 56 F.T.C. at 632-33 (citations omitted).
155But see Bakers Franchise Corp., 56 F.T.C. 1636 (1959). Reports which do
not meet Jencks standards, however, are subject to the work product privilege and
hearsay objections. E.g., Viviano Macaroni Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8666, [1965-1967
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,467 (1966).
156E.g., Bakers Franchise Corp., 56 F.T.C. 1636 (1959); see Mohawk Refining
Corp. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1959).
157E.g., Basic Books Inc., 56 F.T.C. 69, 85-86 (1959), aff'd, 276 F.2d 718 (7th
Cir. 1960).
158See Royal Constr. Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8690, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder]
TRADE: REG. REP. 17,722 (1966); Graber Mfg. Co., FTC Dkt. 8038, [1965-1967
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP'. 17,409 (1965); Giant Food, Inc., 58 F.T.C.
1193 (1961). These decisions can also be questioned in light of recent developments
indicating that fairness requires disclosure of exculpatory materials in the govern-
ment's possession. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
159 E.g., R. H. Macy & Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8650, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder]
TRADE: REG. REP. 17,458 (1966); Ernest Mark High, 56 F.T.C. 625, 633 (1959).
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the FTC has decided at least six Jencks-type cases.'O On the one
hand, it has expanded Jencks Act principles by ruling that notes of
an FTC investigator appearing as a government witness must be dis-
closed 16 and that, in unusual circumstances, complaint counsel's corre-
spondence with respondent's customers must be produced, even though
the customers are not called as government witnesses.'1 2  On the other
hand, the Commission has declined to authorize pretrial discovery of
prior statements by government witnesses. 15
In an attempt to dispel possible confusion and, perhaps, reduce
appeals and delay, the Commission recently explained its views in the
twin decisions of L. G. Balfour Co.' and Inter-State Builders, Inc.6 '
First, the Commission reaffirmed its dedication to the Jencks Act as
a guide for hearing procedures in the FTC. If complaint counsel
objects to disclosure of a prior statement, the examiner is to inspect
the report in camera and determine, first, whether it is a statement
within the terms of the Act, and, second, whether it is relevant to
the witness' testimony. After deletion of irrelevant, but not other-
wise privileged or inadmissible matters, the report must be submitted
to respondent. Moreover, only investigator reports meeting either the
signed statement or the "substantially verbatim" and "recorded con-
temporaneously" tests of the Act will be available to respondent.1 66
Commissioner Elman has disputed these decisions in a powerful
dissent, arguing that the restrictive provisions of the Act should not
apply to FTC procedures if the principle of fairness sought in the
Jencks decision is to be observed.' 67 He asserts that an agent's sum-
marization should be disclosed, since, unlike criminal proceedings, FTC
190 Royal Constr. Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8690, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP., 17,722 (1966); Sperry & Hutchinson Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8671 (Inter-
locutory Orders Sept. 28, 1966 & Oct. 4, 1966); Viviano Macaroni Co., FTC Dkt.
No. 8666, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. Rx'. 17,467 (1966) ; R. H. Macy
& Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8650, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. R '. 17,458
(1966) ; Inter-State Builders, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8624, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REI'. 17,532 (1966) ; Graber Mfg. Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8038, [1965-1967
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,409 (1965).
161 R. H. Macy & Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8659, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. 1 17,458 (1966). The Jencks Act does not itself require disclosure in this
situation because, by its terms, it is limited to disclosure of a statement "by a govern-
ment witness . . . to an agent of the government" 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1964).
162 Sperry & Hutchinson Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8671 (Interlocutory Orders Sept
28, 1966 & Oct. 4, 1966).
163Viviano Macaroni Co., FTC Dkt. No. 8777, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder]
TRADE: REG. REP. 1 17,467 (1966).
164 FTC Dkt. No. 8435, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1 17,532
(1966).
165 FTC Dkt. No. 8624, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1 17,532
(1966).
166 Id.
167 Inter-State Builders, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8624, L. G. Balfour Co., FTC Dkt.
No. 8435, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 11 7,532 (1966).
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investigators seldom rely on "substantially verbatim" notes; rather,
they are trained to summarize a witness' views. Moreover, the Com-
mission itself relies heavily on these reports in issuing complaints.
Their reliability is within the Commission's control and thus they
should be available for impeachment purposes in FTC hearings,' since
such hearings are not bound by the rules of evidence applicable in jury
trials.169 Otherwise, according to Commissioner Elman, "the rule
of the Jencks case . . . will no longer play any significant role in
FTC proceedings or afford any real protection to respondents in
adversary proceedings where they are charged by the Commission with
having violated the law." 1'7
There seems little to recommend the majority position. Its con-
cern for the disruptive effect on witnesses, on complaint counsel and
examiners of any disclosure of summaries, as contrasted with verbatim
transcripts, seems unsound.' 7' The overriding concern of Jencks-that
the government should not hide information useful to the defense--is
108 [E]vidence or testimony, even though legally incompetent, if of the kind
that usually affects fair-minded men in the conduct of their daily and more
important affairs, should be received and considered; but it should be fairly
done.
John Bene & Sons, Inc. v. FTC, 299 F. 468, 471 (2d Cir. 1924).
169 See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 703-06 (1948) ; Buchwalter
v. FTC, 235 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d
378, 380 (2d Cir. 1945). See generally DAvis TREATIsE § 14.11.
170 Inter-State Builders, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8624, L. G. Balfour Co., FTC Dkt.
No. 8435, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. RES. f 17,532 (1966), at 22, 813.
For a different view of the purposes of the FTC Rules, see All-State Indus., Inc.,
FTC Dkt. No. 8738, 3 TRADE REG. REP. ff 18,103 (1967), quoted at note 3 suipra.
171 Commissioner Jones made four arguments for the majority in Inter-State:
(1) disclosure of summaries would hamper Commission attorneys in their work,
especially in conducting investigations; (2) summaries would not provide an accurate
basis for cross-examination because they inevitably reflect the investigator's thoughts
and subjective impressions; (3) witnesses readily could be confused and misled by
respondent counsel's use of summaries; and (4) inaccurate summaries might even
cause a witness to change or modify his statement "to the obvious detriment of [the]
truth . . . ." Inter-State Builders, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 8624, [1965-1967 Transfer
Binder] TRADE Rx. REP. 117,532, at 22, 800 (1966). Commissioner Elman's dis-
sent, however, seems persuasive. First, unless the "substantially verbatim" require-
ment is but a guise adopted by the Commission to circumvent the Jencks Act
rule, it would equally hamper a Commission attorney's investigative performance in
the same manner as a rule requiring disclosure of summaries. Thus, the majority's
first argument opposes any Jencks-type rule. The incongruity of the majority's posi-
tion is apparent when it is noted that the premise of their argument is that the sum-
maries of attorney-investigators are neither objective nor reliable-even though the
Commission relies heavily on such reports in determining whether to issue a complaint
or to approve a consent decree. Cf. Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487 (1963).
Second, even if not wholly accurate, a summarized interview report may be as useful
to the defense in impeaching or discrediting a witness' testimony as a signed affidavit
or "substantially verbatim" recording. There is protection against inaccuracies, be-
cause, when confronted with his prior statement, the witness on cross-examination
will have an opportunity to offer any relevant explanation. Third,
The purpose of the Jencks rule is not to shield a Government witness
from embarrassment, discomfiture, or even the inconvenience of having to ex-
plain or justify alleged inconsistencies between his testimony and prior state-
ments contained in an interview report. If it transpires that there are in fact
no inconsistencies, because the report is incomplete or inaccurate or for some
other reason, the net result will be to bolster his testimoiy. In any event,
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sacrificed without sound justification. It is not enough, as one member
of the Commission blandly suggests, that, since the Jencks Act pro-
cedure provides sufficient procedural protection in criminal matters, it
a fortiori is adequate in FTC hearings.'72 Different considerations
may apply. 3  If the real concern of the Commission is to preserve or
restore a balance between often inexperienced complaint counsel and
experienced and able counsel retained by economically powerful re-
spondents,1 74 secreting potentially exonerating facts from the defense
seems an inappropriate device to counter such power. For the same
reason, the Commission's ruling that complaint counsel can avoid dis-
closure by "expunging" a government witness' testimony seems equally
erroneous.17 5  It, too, may result in the Commission's "winning" its
case despite the presence of undisclosed exculpatory material in the
FTC's files. If delay is the concern, neither Balfour nor Inter-State
is likely to contribute to a solution. Appeals may in fact increase
because of the ambiguity of the "substantially verbatim" and other
borrowed tests.
CoNqcLUSION
It is time for the FTC to reconsider the bases and objectives of
its confidentiality policies at the hearing level. The urgency of this
need is emphasized by the fact that acceptance of FTC decisions by the
business community, the bar and the public is undoubtedly dependent
whether in the end his testimony is strengthened or weakened thereby, the
Jencks rule is designed to subject it to the rigorous test of cross-examination.
Inter-State Builders, Inc., FTC Dit. No. 8624, L. G. Balfour Co., FTC Dkt. No.
8453, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REPS. 17,532, at 22,815 (1966).
Finally, "the standards of fairness and decency applicable to the Government in its
relation to its citizens whenever it seeks to impose upon them the penalties, sanctions,
or restraints of the law" require disclosure of witness' summaries.
A Government lawyer is an advocate for a client whose interest is not so much
to win a case as to do justice. And it is not just and not fair for the Govern-
ment to withhold a document in its possession which, if made available to the
accused, could exculpate him or assist him in making his defense.
Id. at 22,814-15 (footnotes omitted).
In terms of overall FTC litigation, moreover, the .encks rule is of marginal
significance. Seldom is cross-examination the cornerstone of respondent's defense,
whether the charge be false advertising, discriminatory advertising allowances or an
unlawful merger. This further demonstrates the inaccuracy of the majority's claim
that application of the Jencks decision would hamper Commission investigations.
172 Inter-State Builders, Inc., FTC Dit. No. 8624, L. G. Balfour Co., FTC Dit.
No. 8453, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,532, at 22,812 (1966).
This ignores the absence of a tradition of criminal discovery, as opposed to a long
history of discovery in the civil area.
17 Compare Note, 68 YALE LJ. 1409, 1422-23 (1959), with Traynor, Ground
Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 228 (1964). See also,
Synposium-Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47 (1963).
174 Cf. Taylor, The Supreme Court, the Indiidual and the Criminal Process,
1 GA. L. REv. 386, 450-55 (1967); Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance
of Advantage i2; Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.. 1149 (1960).
115 Note, 68 YALE L.J. 1409, 1422-23 (1959).
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in large part on the fairness of Commission proceedings. Moreover,
procedures at the trial stage operate free from Commission control,
except for the most egregious errors.' 6 Judicial review of procedural
rulings is, in addition, generally limited to the appeal of a final FTC
decision on the merits; 177 but for most questions of confidentiality or
disclosure, this review is too late to be meaningful. Only in exceptional
cases where delay will prevent an effective remedy and irreparable harm
is threatened or "the agency has stepped so plainly beyond the bounds
of its authority, or acted clearly in defiance of it," will a district court
exercise its equity jurisdiction and intervene before the agency's
processes have run their course.1"' Such limited judicial scrutiny of
evidentiary and procedural rulings in Commission hearings should
spur the agency to independent review of its confidentiality procedures,
rather than excuse inertia.
170 The Commission will grant permission to file an interlocutory appeal only
upon a showing that the ruling complained of involves substantial rights and
will materially affect the final decision, and that a determination of its cor-
rectness before conclusion of the hearing is essential to serve the interests of
justice.
FTC Rules § 3.23(a), 32 Fed. Reg. 8451 (1967); see, e.g., School Services, Inc.,
FTC Dkt. No. 8729, 3 TRADE REG. RP. 1 18,064 (1967); General Transmissions
Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 8713, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REa. RzP. 1 17,813
(1966).
1
"
7 Review of final FTC orders to cease and desist is routed directly to the courts
of appeals. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1964). And such jurisdiction is exclusive. 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(d) (1964); Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 140 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 322 U.S. 752 (1944).
178R. H. Macy & Co. v. Tinley, 249 F. Supp. 778, 782 (D.D.C. 1965). See also
Frito-Lay, Inc. v. FTC, 380 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Elmo Div. of Drive-X Co. v.
Dixon, 348 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Graber Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, 223 F. Supp.
1020 (D.D.C. 1963).
